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Abstract. Blockchain, as an immutable distributed ledger, can be the
key to realize secure and trustworthy IoT applications. However, exist-
ing blockchains can hardly achieve high-performance and high-security
for large-scale IoT applications simultaneously. In this paper, we pro-
pose a hyper blockchain architecture combining the security of public
blockchains with the efficiency of private blockchains. An IoT anchor-
ing smart contract is proposed to anchor private IoT blockchains into
a public blockchain. An IoT device management smart contract is also
designed to trace sensory data. A comprehensive analysis reveals that
the proposed hybrid blockchain system can achieve the performance of
private blockchains and resist tampering.
Keywords: Blockchain · Internet of Things · Smart Contract.
1 Introduction
The Internet-of-Things (IoT) technology has been digitizing the physical world
with ubiquitous smart devices [1]. The IoT data in centralized IoT systems are
exposed to various threats, e.g., natural disasters and cyber-attacks. Meanwhile,
the centralized IoT system cannot guarantee data transparency and therefore,
goes against IoT data sharing among multiple parties. By storing data in blocks
with their hash values chained in a peer-to-peer network, the blockchain technol-
ogy is able to provide immutable, transparent and trustworthy ledger services
for IoT applications [1]. The blockchain technology has been employed in IoT as
the root of trust, e.g., access control [2] and data securing [3].
A significant challenge of applying the blockchain technology into IoT ap-
plications is the trade-off between performance and security [4]. To be specific,
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blockchains can be divided into private (consortium) blockchains, e.g., Hyper-
ledger Fabric [5], and public blockchains, e.g., Ethereum [6]. Running in small-
scale networks, private blockchains are able to provide high capacity and low
latency services but can only tolerate limited failures or attacks. For example,
Fabric can achieve 3,500 transactions per second with a latency of less than one
second [5]. Public blockchains, on the contrary, can tolerate large-scale failures
but can only provide low capacity and long delay. For example, Bitcoin can
only accept seven transactions per second and needs a confirmation time of 10
minutes [1].
In this paper, we propose a hybrid blockchain system combining the ad-
vantages of public blockchains and private blockchains. The proposed hybrid
blockchain system is able to achieve the capacity of thousands of transactions
per second with a latency of seconds based on the private blockchain technol-
ogy. The hybrid blockchain system can achieve tamper-proof of existing blocks
and stop a limited number of victim nodes from creating forged blocks and fake
anchoring proof. An IoT device registration and revocation smart contract is
developed to ensure the traceability of IoT sensory data and prevent forged IoT
data. We carry out a comprehensive analysis of the performance and security of
the hybrid blockchain system. Our analysis indicates that the hybrid blockchain
system can achieve the performance of private blockchains and resist tampering
even all the IoT blockchain miners are compromised.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the related works
are surveyed, followed by the proposed hybrid blockchain system in Section 3.
A comprehensive analysis of the hybrid blockchain system is carried out in Sec-
tion 4, followed by the conclusions in Section 5.
2 Related Work
As pieces of computer code running on top of blockchain, smart contract trans-
lates various assets, such as IoT devices and digital assets, into virtual identities
in blockchain, and enables them to interact with other assets [7]. Smart contract
technology plays an important role in providing authentication rules, managing
and securing IoT data [8] in an automatic manner.
Blockchain has been introduced into IoT applications for access control [2],
data securing [3], etc. A smart contract was developed in [2]. The smart contract
allowed managers to define access control policy for IoT data. In [3], a secured
IoT data storage system was presented over a blockchain. Specifically, the data
was stored in Distributed Hash Tables (DHTs) while the pointer to the DHT
storage address was secured in a blockchain. The blockchain also took charge of
the access control of the IoT data.
The combination of public blockchains and private blockchains can achieve
the security of the public blockchain with the efficiency and confidentiality of
the private blockchain [9,10,11]. In [9], the private blockchain was introduced
to verify the accuracy of IoT data and broadcast transactions, while the public
blockchain was used to verify consistency and store data. A hybrid blockchain
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system combining a public blockchain and private blockchains was developed
in [10]. The public blockchain was introduced as external monitors to store public
information, e.g., geolocation information from trucks. The private blockchains
were used for sensitive information, e.g., shipment information.
By utilizing the immutability of public blockchains, data can be anchored to
a public blockchain to create a timestamp proof [12]. The anchoring technology
was further extended to IoT applications [13,2,14,3]. For example, IoT devices
were clustered into groups where the header nodes signed the IoT data centrally
and attached the data to the public blockchain directly [14].
3 Hybrid Blockchain System
3.1 Overview
The proposed hybrid blockchain system consists of a public blockchain and mul-
tiple IoT blockchains, as shown in Fig. 1. The hybrid blockchain system provides
a trusted and reliable IoT data storage service that only the sensory data from
registered IoT devices can be recorded and verified.
Fig. 1. The proposed hybrid blockchain system.
The public blockchain is considered to be trustworthy and used as the root
of trust for IoT blockchains. This is a practical assumption because popular
Proof-of-Work (PoW) blockchains can resist attacks with less 25% of the total
computing power [15]. The public blockchain takes in charge of low-frequent
functions, e.g., IoT blockchain initialization and IoT blockchain anchoring, by
running smart contracts. As a public popular blockchain platform, Ethereum
can be a good choice for the public blockchain, which has been widely adopted
in researches [6,16].
IoT blockchains can be private blockchains and run at high speeds for high-
capacity and low-latency IoT services. IoT blockchains adopt consortium con-
sensus protocols, e.g., Practical Byzantine Fault-Tolerant (PBFT) [17]. Each
IoT blockchain, consisting of miners and IoT devices, can be set up and main-
tained by a consortium. The IoT devices collect and send sensory data to the IoT
blockchain in the form of transactions. The miners are requested to be registered
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in the public blockchain and managed by participators of the IoT blockchain.
The miners validate IoT transactions and generate blocks in IoT blockchain.
All the nodes, including IoT blockchain miners and IoT devices, have their
unique public/private keys and can be identified by their corresponding public
keys (or the equivalent blockchain addresses). The private keys, with the assump-
tion of absolute security, are the foundation of blockchain security and prevent
identity forging attacks [16]. Note that, miners of an IoT blockchain use the same
pairs of public/private keys across the public blockchain and IoT blockchain.
The IoT blockchain blocks are anchored to the public blockchain periodically
with a predefined interval of t to improve data integrity. This is achieved by cal-
culating the hash values of the anchoring blocks in the IoT blockchain and then
registering the hash values on the public blockchain. In order to stop attackers
from forging and/or stopping the blockchain anchoring, a vote-based consensus
protocol is proposed over smart contracts.
3.2 Steps to Run an IoT Blockchain
IoT Blockchain Registration. Let m denote the number of IoT blockchain
miners. An IoT blockchain is registered on the public blockchain first before
starting the IoT blockchain. This is realized by a smart contract on the public
blockchain. The smart contract stores the IoT blockchain ID, hash of the genesis
block, and a list of IoT blockchain miners.
The IoT blockchain registration needs to be confirmed by all the miners of
the IoT blockchain. In other words, the IoT registration smart contract needs m
different confirmations and cannot tolerate any failure.
IoT Devices Registration and Revocation. IoT devices need to be reg-
istered on the IoT blockchain before sending sensory data. The devices are iden-
tified by their blockchain addresses/public keys. The public keys of IoT devices
are registered by the IoT blockchain miners for the verification of IoT transac-
tions. The IoT revocation also needs to be confirmed by IoT blockchain miners.
The private keys of IoT devices can only be seen by the IoT devices, which
suppresses forged transactions.
Suppose that the IoT device registration/revocation can tolerate τm failures
and needs at least (m − τm) confirmations. The threshold τm can be defined
by the IoT consortium to trade off between security and failure tolerance. The
registration and revocation of IoT devices can be realized by an IoT management
smart contract on the IoT blockchain. The smart contract storing IoT blockchain
miners and registered IoT devices can only be called by IoT blockchain miners.
IoT Transaction Generation. The IoT devices generate transactions by
embedding sensory data in the data field of the transactions, sign the transac-
tions with their private keys and send the signed transactions to IoT blockchain
miners.
IoT Blockchain Growing. The IoT blockchain miners collect IoT transac-
tions and then verify the senders by checking whether the senders are registered
in the IoT management smart contract. If the transactions are from registered
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IoT devices, the transactions are kept for further mining. Otherwise, the trans-
actions will be dropped by the miners.
The IoT blockchain miners then run consensus protocols to mine transactions
into blocks. The miners also anchor the IoT blockchain into the public blockchain
by sending the hash values of check blocks with a predefined interval to the
smart contract in the public blockchain. The hash of the check block in the IoT
blockchain must be consistent with the registered block in the public blockchain.
The verification process can be adopted as a part of the block consensus protocol.
Suppose that the IoT blockchain anchoring can tolerate τr malicious miners
and needs at least (m− τr) different confirmations. The threshold τr is defined
by IoT blockchain miners to trade off between integrity and failure tolerance.
IoT Sensory Data Verification. The proposed hybrid blockchain system
realizes a chain of trust where the trust is passed from the public blockchain to
IoT transactions through the IoT blockchain anchoring contract, IoT blockchain
miners, and the IoT device management contract.
To verify an IoT transaction, the examiner first verifies the latest check block
and the IoT blockchain miners with the help of the IoT anchoring smart contract
on the public blockchain. The examiner then checks the identity of the sender
of the IoT transaction with the IoT device management contract on the IoT
blockchain at the height of the IoT transaction. The examiner lastly checks the
signature of the IoT transaction. The IoT transaction is trustworthy if all the
above steps are verified successfully.
3.3 Smart Contracts
We propose an IoT blockchain anchoring contract on the public blockchain to
connect the public blockchain and IoT blockchain and an IoT device management
contract on the IoT blockchain for IoT device registration and revocation.
IoT Blockchain Anchoring Contract. This contract provides blockchain
registration and anchoring service for a single IoT blockchain. An IoT blockchain
can be registered with its IoT blockchain ID, the hash value of the genesis block
and miners. The contract needs to be deployed on the public blockchain by one
of the miners. The IoT blockchain ID, the hash value of the genesis block and
miner list can be hard-coded into the smart contract. In this way, the other IoT
blockchain miners only need to give approval to the contract rather than pass
all the data to the contract for registration.
Functions in the IoT blockchain anchoring contract can be given as follows.
1. IoT blockchain confirmation function: This function manages the state of the
IoT blockchain. The smart contract sets the state of the IoT blockchain as
“pending” by default. The contract keeps a list of predefined IoT blockchain
miners and their states. When all the miners have confirmed the IoT blockchain,
the contract marks the IoT blockchain as “running”.
2. IoT block anchoring function: This function implements the block anchoring
service. The smart contract stores an object, including a block index, a block
state, callers and the block hash values from the callers, for an anchored
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block. After the smart contract has received (m − τr) confirmations from
different miners with the same block index, block hash value, the block state
is updated to be “registered”.
IoT Device Management Contract. This smart contract manages IoT
devices with their blockchain address. This contract is deployed in the genesis
block of the IoT blockchain by one of the miners. The contract provides IoT
device registration and revocation services by two functions. This smart contract
only accepts function calls from IoT blockchain miners. We assume that these
two functions are independent and can tolerate τm failures. In other words, both
IoT registration and revocation need (m − τm) approvals from different IoT
blockchain miners.
1. IoT device registration function: This function collects verification about IoT
devices from IoT blockchain miners and then registers the IoT devices into
the IoT blockchain. In the first time that an IoT device uploads IoT data
to the IoT blockchain, it notifies its IoT blockchain address to all the IoT
miners. The IoT miners call the IoT device registration function and pass
the IoT blockchain address of the IoT device to the smart contract for the
registration of the IoT device.
If this function is called with a new IoT blockchain address, the contract
creates a new IoT object containing the blockchain address, the default “un-
confirmed” state, and the caller address. If this function is called with an
existing IoT blockchain address, the contract first adds the caller into the
corresponding IoT object. If the address is confirmed by (m− τm) different
miners, the state of the IoT blockchain address is updated as “registered”.
2. IoT device revocation function: This function collects IoT device revocation
requests from IoT blockchain miners and updates the states of IoT devices.
The IoT blockchain miners should reach consensus to revoke an IoT device.
The IoT miners then call the IoT device revocation function and pass the
IoT blockchain address of the IoT device to the smart contract.
In the case that this function is called with an unknown IoT blockchain
address, the smart contract just ignores the function call. In the case that
this function is called with a registered IoT blockchain address for the first
time, the smart contract adds a “pending” state and the caller address to the
corresponding IoT object in the smart contract. In the case that the function
is called to update a “pending” address, the smart contract adds the caller
to the IoT object. If the revocation request for an IoT blockchain address is
confirmed by (m− τm) different miners, the smart contract removes the IoT
object of the IoT blockchain address.
4 System Analysis
4.1 Performance Analysis
The performance of IoT blockchain is upper bounded by the performance of its
consensus protocol. Between block anchoring, the IoT blockchain can achieve the
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performance of the consensus protocol. For example, the IoT blockchain can use
the consensus protocol realized in the FastFabric blockchain with the capacity
of up to 20,000 transactions per second [18].
When a block is anchored to the public blockchain, the IoT blockchain needs
to temporarily synchronize with the public blockchain. Thus, the performance
of the IoT blockchain is reduced around check blocks. However, long block an-
choring intervals can have a negative impact on the IoT blockchain security, as
will be analyzed in Section 4.2.
4.2 Security Analysis
We assume that the public blockchain is trustworthy and cannot be tampered.
The IoT blockchain has been confirmed by all the IoT blockchain miners. At-
tackers can temporarily control v IoT blockchain miners at the same time. In this
paper, we analyze the case that IoT device registration and block registration fol-
low the same failure tolerance of the consensus protocol, i.e., τ = τc = τm = τr.
Other cases can be similarly analyzed.
Stopping Services. We first analyze the attack that victim miners stop
working. We can have the following conclusions. a) When v ≤ τ , the IoT
blockchain can tolerate the failure and keep on growing and anchoring blocks
into the public chain, and IoT devices can register in or revoke from the IoT
blockchain; b) When v > τ , the IoT blockchain cannot grow, and IoT device
cannot register in or revoke from the IoT blockchain.
Tampering Existing Transactions and Blocks. The attackers cannot
tamper existing IoT transactions in the name of registered IoT devices. This is
because the IoT transactions are signed with the private keys of IoT devices,
and the private keys are kept by their owners. The tampered transactions, if
any, cannot pass the signature verification. When v < (m− τ), attackers cannot
tamper any existing block in the IoT blockchain. When (m − τ) ≤ v ≤ m,
attackers can tamper existing blocks after the last check block, e.g., forking the
IoT chain and dropping transactions in existing blocks. The attackers cannot
tamper any block before the last check block because the blocks are secured in
the public blockchain by the anchoring.
IoT Devices Registration and Revocation. a) When v < (m − τ),
attackers cannot register any IoT device nor revoke IoT devices. b) When (m−
τ) ≤ v ≤ m, attackers are able to register their own IoT devices and revoke any
registered IoT devices.
Forging Transactions and Blocks. a) When v < (m−τ), attackers cannot
create forged transactions nor blocks. b) When (m− τ) ≤ v ≤ m, attackers can
register their IoT devices and then create forged new transactions and blocks.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we designed a hybrid blockchain system which anchors private IoT
blockchains to a public blockchain. The proposed hybrid blockchain system is
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able to provide high capacity and low latency services for IoT application while
preserving data integrity with the help of public blockchains. An IoT device
management smart contract on IoT blockchain was also proposed for IoT device
registration and revocation to improve traceability.
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